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I. Climate Change and The Science-Policy Divide
In response to a growing body of research pointing to human-induced 
warming of Earth’s climate, and in recognition of the potentially sweeping impacts 
of climate change for humanity, the world’s governments launched the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. The IPCC is a consulta-
tive body of volunteer scientists charged with periodically assessing the state of 
knowledge in the many areas of research relating to climate change, including 
both the physical and social sciences. Given the scope of these assessments, the 
IPCC has come to be viewed as the singular authority on climate change. The 
IPCC derives this authority from the credibility of its scientists,1 the comprehen-
sive review that its assessments undergo,2 and the consensus that the assessments 
require from a broad range of participants, including governments and civil society 
organizations.3 The IPCC has been object of intense criticism since its creation,4 
largely because of the considerable implications of climate change for public policy. 
The tension between the IPCC and its critics serve as a clear example of the uneasy 
relationship between science, the authority it aims to represent, and the rest of 
society. 
Although popular conceptions of science often depict a clearly demarcated 
line between the objective facts discovered by science and the negotiated values of 
the sociopolitical realm,5 the relationship between the two is in fact far more com-
plex. Scientific processes and institutions influence, and are influenced by, political 
ones; trends in one field leave their mark in the other. The emergence of the mod-
ern scientific method in the seventeenth century, conceived of as a disinterested 
enterprise replicable by anyone with access to equivalent data and instruments, was 
intimately tied to the simultaneous rise of liberal conceptions of political author-
ity like equality and equitable representation.6 Conversely, the Newtonian concept 
of discrete particles of matter, for example, laid the foundation for our “liberal 
conception of ‘possessive individualism’ [in which] consent was to be granted by 
1  InterAcademy Council (IAC), “Climate Change Assessments: Review of the Processes and 
Procedures of the IPCC” August 30, 2010, 18.
2  Shardul Agrawala, “Structural and Process History of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change,” Climatic Change 39 (1998): 624.
3  Peter Haas, “When Does Power Listen to Truth? A Constructivist Approach to the Policy 
Process,” Journal of European Public Policy 11:4 (2004): 578.
4  Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, “Global Climate Protection Policy: The Limits of Scientific 
Advice, Part 2,” Global Environmental Change, 4, 3 (1994): 195-196.
5  See Haas, “When Does Power Listen to Truth?” 571.
6  Karen Liftin, “Environment, Wealth, and Authority: Global Climate Change and Emerg-
ing Modes of Legitimation,” International Studies Review 2(2000): 130.
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atomistic individuals who ‘owned’ the ‘property’ of themselves.”7
Despite these mutual interactions, tensions often arise as scientists and 
politicians employ different tools in pursuit of very different goals. Science uses 
observation, isolation of variables, and replication to advance knowledge about the 
study object; its goals are (ostensibly) without reference to values or ethics. Politics, 
on the other hand, uses negotiation and consensus in order to build social order 
based upon precisely those values and ethics. 
Science is itself a social institution. The scientific community scrutinizes new 
findings to ensure that they are consistent with the existing body of knowledge. 
If the discovery overthrows an aspect of current understanding, the result will 
be evaluated with particular care. This examination is most commonly carried 
out through peer-review, replication, and successive scientific inquiry that either 
validates or invalidates the discovery. Scientific claims thus arrive to a consensus by 
standing the test of challenges through time. 
While some scientific disciplines such as particle physics or the biology of 
animals that live in deep-sea vents appear to have little to do with human society, 
other fields such as river chemistry or stem cell biology have profound implica-
tions for society. In these fields, in which science and policy interact particularly 
strongly, there are numerous ways of understanding the science-policy interface. 
The positivist perspective assumes that science informs the decision-maker of ob-
jective realities or projections to which the decision-maker then incorporates social 
or political considerations.8 By contrast, constructivism asserts that there are no 
objective truths and that all knowledge is value-laden,9 starting with the very act of 
making observations: 
We speak of ‘collecting’ data, as if they were apples or clams, but 
in fact we literally make data: marks on paper, microscopic pits on 
an optical disk, electrical charges in a silicon chip…Data remain a 
human creation, and they are always material; they always exist in a 
medium.10 
Scientific facts cannot be separated from their acquisition (through experiment or 
intervention) and subsequent interpretation; they are neither completely objective 
nor subjective, but rather fall within “the framework of co-production – the simul-
taneous making of the natural and social worlds.”11 
Although positivism and its accompanying linear model of science-for-policy 
7  Liftin, “Environmental Wealth,” 130.
8  Reiner Grundmann, “The Role of Expertise in Governance Processes,” Forest Policy and 
Economics 11 (2009): 398.
9  See Haas, “When Does Power Listen to Truth?”588 or Jan Corfee-Morlot, Mark Maslin, 
and Jaquelin Burgess, “Global Warming in the Public Sphere,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society 365 (2007): 2744.
10  Edwards, A Vast Machine, 109.
11  Sheila Jasanoff, “A New Climate for Society,” Theory, Culture & Society 27:2–3 (2010): 
237.
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are increasingly considered obsolete,12 “the pious reverence for science it encour-
aged lives on” with the concept of ‘sound science.’13 The phrase is thought to have 
first been deployed strategically in 1993 by The Advancement of Sound Science 
Coalition (TASSC), a now defunct organization set up by APCO, a public rela-
tions firm of Philip Morris.14 As TASSC expressed, 
science that is used to guide public policy decisions should be based on 
sound principles -- not on emotions and beliefs considered by some as 
‘politically correct.’ Too often, public policy decisions that are based on 
inadequate science impose enormous economic costs.15 
The concept of sound science in fact translates into a higher burden of proof that 
science must bear before policy makers can take action to address a given issue, 
whether public health or the environment.16 Discussions around sound science 
frequently equate “the quality of scientific analysis with the degree of scientific 
certainty.”17
Science is expected to present society (policy makers, the public, and other 
stakeholders) with information that is devoid of the influence of political consid-
erations or values. Those experts who appear furthest removed from policy (those 
whose reputations, for example, are based on research rather than advocacy or who 
are not linked with any “sponsoring sources”18) are seen as most credible in the 
political realm. The very act of engaging in policy discussions can appear to taint 
the reputations of such scientists. Furthermore, those in advisory roles “must nego-
tiate their credibility not only among the policymakers but also within their own 
research communities whose work they are representing and translating.”19 
Climate Change
Climate change exemplifies the contradictions that are characteristic of the 
science-policy dilemma. The scientific study of climate change is based solidly in 
the natural sciences: scientists observe the atmosphere, oceans, and ecosystems in 
the most systematic way possible. Through data collected during those observa-
tions and through numerical simulations in models, scientists try to construct a 
coherent view of how Earth’s climate functions. Both the causes and impacts of 
12  See Corfee-Morlot, “Global Warming in the Public Sphere;” Jasanoff, “A New Climate for 
Society;” and Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), Assessing an IPCC Assessment: An 
Analysis of Statements on Projected Regional Impacts in the 2007 Report, 2010: 20.
13  David Demeritt, “Science Studies, Climate Change, and the Prospects for Constructivist 
Critique,” Economy and Society 35:3 (2006): 455.
14  David Michaels, “Doubt is Their Product,” Scientific American, June 2005, 58.
15  Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, June 1993, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
mzh09e00. 
16  Chris Mooney, The Republican War on Science, (2005), 71.
17  Mooney, The Republican War on Science, 73.
18  Haas, “When Does Power Listen to Truth?” 576.
19  Shackley, S. and B. Wynne (1996) ‘Representing Uncertainty in Global Climate Change 
Science for Policy: Boundary-Ordering Devices and Authority’, Science, Technology and Human 
Values 21(3): 275–302. P. 276.
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a changing climate, however, are strongly linked to human systems and societies. 
Ultimately, climate change involves normative judgments, including assumptions 
of how things should or should not be, whether human interference with the natu-
ral environment is inherently good or bad, and what can be considered dangerous 
or safe. The debate around climate change, therefore, is more often about “differ-
ing values and conflicts of interest between different groups in society” than about 
any disagreement over the physical functions of the climate system.20 
This is not to imply that understanding of the physical function of the cli-
mate is resolved. On the contrary, Earth’s climate is extremely complex, and pro-
jections into the future and at regional scales are inherently uncertain. Although 
it is widely acknowledged that some uncertainty is always present in science, the 
debate over the acceptable level of uncertainty continues in a quest for sound sci-
ence: 
There is a widespread perception that science is the final arbiter in the 
climate change debate and that science will ultimately prescribe policy. 
[…I]f there remains scientific uncertainty, carbon emission reductions are 
seen as not legitimate. 21 
Despite the impossibility of eliminating doubt, decision makers often choose to 
wait  for complete scientific certainty before taking action; “[t]his absolves them 
of any responsibility to exercise discretion and leadership.”22 Therefore, while the 
debate over the merits of taking action on climate change is in fact political in 
nature, it is shrouded in the context of scientific inquiry and is largely presented as 
a debate over the extent of scientific knowledge and certainty.
The IPCC attempts to respond to some of these challenges as it bridges 
the scientific and policy communities. Its mandate is to produce reports that are 
“policy relevant and yet policy neutral.”23 Given the inherent tensions between 
science and society, the challenge of conveying uncertainty, and the high stakes of 
climate change, that brief mandate represents a significant challenge. In this paper, 
we evaluate the critiques of the IPCC as it struggles to address these dilemmas to 
understand the broader relationship of science to society. 
II. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
History of the IPCC
Established as a consultative body of international scientists in 1988, the 
IPCC periodically reviews and assesses the state of knowledge of climate change: 
how the climate has changed and why; what changes may occur in the future; 
how those changes may impact natural, social, and economic systems; and what 
20  Meyer et al, “The Factualization of Uncertainty: Risks, Politics, and Genetically Modified 
Crops- a Case of Rape,” Agriculture and Human Values (2005) 22: 237.
21  Grundmann, “The Role of Expertise in Governance Processes,” 401.
22  Demeritt, The Construction of Global Warming, 329.
23  http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm.
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can be done to adapt to and mitigate climate change. IPCC reports are published 
approximately every six years through an extensive review and compilation process 
that involves hundreds of volunteer authors and reviewers.  
The IPCC was created following more than a quarter century of growing 
concern over a warming world. In 1957, the American Federal Environmental 
Sciences Services Administration launched two carbon dioxide (CO2) monitor-
ing stations in coordination with Scripps Institution of Oceanography.24 Less 
than a decade later, the question of anthropogenic climate change was brought 
to national attention when President Johnson’s administration published a report 
warning of dangerous human interference with the climate.25
Over the next two decades, the scientific evidence of human-induced climate 
change grew more robust, and by the early 1980s, world governments participated 
in three international conferences held by the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion (WMO): the First World Climate Conference in 1979,26 and then two joint 
WMO/United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) conferences in 1980 
and 1985.27 Three years later, as the global nature and sweeping implications of 
climate change grew increasingly clear, the IPCC was formed under the auspices of 
the UNEP and the WMO. 
Structure of the IPCC
The Panel itself is comprised of representatives from 194 member countries, 
which include officials from relevant government ministries and agencies as well as 
experts from national research institutions and observer organizations.28 The IPCC 
and its assessment process have been characterized as a “boundary organization,” 
for bringing together scientists, governments, non-governmental organizations 
and industry groups from both developing and developed nations.29 This type of 
epistemic community is characterized by broad coalitions of actors that are bound 
together by shared knowledge.30 By contrast, in advocacy networks, actors are 
bound together by shared values.31  The Panel meets approximately once a year 
at the plenary level, where representatives review and approve the most recently 
24  Charles Keeling, “Is Carbon Dioxide from Fossil Fuels Changing Man’s Environment, 
American Philosophical Society, 114:1 (1970): 11.
25  Naomi Oreskes, Testimony before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, 
U.S. Senate. December 6, 2006: 3. 
26  International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), World Climate Conference 
Bulletin, 165:1 (2009):1. 
27  The Social Learning Group, Learning to Manage Global Environmental Risk-Volume I: A 
Comparative History of Social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone Depletion, and Acid Rain (Cam-
bridge, Massachusettes: MIT Press, 2001), 2B3.
28 http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_structure.shtml.
29  Clair Gough and Simon Shackley, “The Respectable Politics of Climate Change: the Epis-
temic Communities and NGOs,” International Affairs, 77, 2 (2001): 332, 334; Bernd Siebenhüner, 
“The Changing Role of Nation States in International Environmental Assessments—the Case of the 
IPCC,” Global Environmental Change 13 (2003): 113.
30  In the sense of Haas, “When Does Power Listen to Truth?” 578.
31  Abby Kinchy, “Epistemic Boomerang: Expert Policy Advice as Leverage in the Campaign 
Against Transgenic Maize in Mexico,” Mobilization: An International Journal” 15, 2 (2010): 183.
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completed report or set the agenda for next assessment.32 During these plenary ses-
sions, the Panel is also responsible for electing the IPCC Chair and Bureau, as well 
as for overseeing the budget, structure, and mandate of the IPCC.33 
The assessment work of the IPCC is divided between three Working Groups. 
Working Group I (WG-I) assesses the physical science of climate change, includ-
ing documentation of how the climate system has changed and the most likely 
causes. Working Group II (WG-II) examines the potential impacts of climate 
change, including the vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities of natural, social, and 
economic systems.34 Working Group III (WG-III) analyzes possible mitigation 
measures, including relevant options that limit or prevent greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions.35 The IPCC Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (TFI), 
based in Japan, is charged with calculating and reporting national GHG emis-
sions as well as developing a standard international methodology for the collection 
of GHG emission data.36 Each Working Group and the Task Force is assisted by 
a Technical Support Unit (TSU) that coordinates the group’s research, arranges 
meetings, and assists with compiling the draft reports.37  Finally, the IPCC Secre-
tariat, located in Switzerland, oversees this global organization by helping to plan 
and coordinate all aspects of the IPCC’s activities.38
IPCC Procedure
The IPCC produces its reports through a complex process of literature 
review, assessment, compilation, and approval by experts and governments. This 
multi-stage process begins when the Working Groups present work plans and 
report outlines to the plenary for approval.39 Once the scope of the report has been 
approved, nominations for authors and review editors are solicited from govern-
ments, and Working Group chairs finalize the list of authors.40 Each Working 
Group then assesses the available literature that relates to their particular section 
of the report, working in coordination with their TSU and the IPCC Secretariat.41 
This process emphasizes peer-reviewed work, and non-peer reviewed literature 
must go through a special procedure in order to be incorporated into the report.42
After a first order draft has been compiled, a set of chosen experts review 
and comment on the draft, and their comments are incorporated by the authors 
32  Agrawala, “Structural and Process History,” 623.
33  http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_structure.shtml. 
34  IPCC IPCC, Summary for Policy Makers in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Repot of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (AR4 WGII SPM) (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 8.
35  http://www.ipcc-wg3.de/. 
36  http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/. 
37  http://www.ipcc.ch/working_groups/working_groups.htm. 
38  http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_structure.shtml. 
39  Ibid.
40  Renate Christ, “IPCC Products, Procedures and Processes” (presentation given in Amster-
dam, May 14, 2010): slide 5. 
41  Agrawala, “Structural and Process History,” 623.
42  Rajendra Pachauri, “IAC Review Meeting” (presentation given in Amsterdam, May 14, 
2010): slides 9-10. 
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under the oversight of the Review Editors. Both governments and experts review 
the second order draft,43 often resulting in extensive revisions: the Fourth Assess-
ment Report received over 90,000 review comments.44 The final products of each 
Working Group are then presented to governments for approval at the Working 
Group’s respective plenary session, and the entire report is eventually approved at a 
full plenary session.45 
In accordance with the IPCC mission of being “policy-relevant, yet policy-
neutral,” the full report of each Working Group is also condensed into a Summary 
for Policy Makers, which aims to be shorter and accessible to non-experts, while 
remaining true to the underlying report. Achieving this balance is not a simple 
task, and governments must approve the text of the SPM line-by-line, with the 
report’s authors present during the approval process to ensure that the SPM is 
consistent with the full report.46
To date, the IPCC has produced four Assessment Reports (in 1990, 1995, 
2001, and 2007), each of which includes the three Working Group reports, the 
Summary for Policy Makers, and an overall Synthesis Report. In addition, the 
IPCC has produced numerous special reports, covering topics from carbon capture 
and storage to emissions scenarios. The Fifth Assessment Report is scheduled for 
publication in 2014. 
IPCC procedures have evolved over time in response to numerous new 
demands, including calls for increased transparency and greater representation of 
scientists from developing countries.47 Dahan-Dalmedico finds that the IPCC has 
successfully incorporated broad based participation and equitable representation, 
in accordance with the principle that countries are “hardly likely to accept analysis 
or measures recommended within the scope of a process from which they have 
been excluded.”48 The IPCC was awarded the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for “their 
efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate 
change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract 
such change.”49 
III. Critiques of the IPCC
Historical Development of IPCC Critiques
Although some consider the IPCC to be a successful model of how science 
can interact with policy democratically,50 and the InterAcademy review of IPCC 
procedures found the organization to be generally successful in its assessments,51 
43  Christ, “IPCC Products,” 5.
44  IAC, “Climate Change Assessments,” 9.
45  Agrawala, “Structural and Process History,” 623.
46  Christ, “IPCC Products,” 6.
47  Agrawala, “Structural and Process History,” 622.
48  Amy Dahan-Dalmedico, “Climate Expertise: Between Scientific Credibility and Geopo-
litical Imperatives,” Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 33, 1 (2008): 79.
49  http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/. 
50  Spencer Weart, The Discovery of Global Warming (Cambridge, Massachusettes: Harvard 
University Press, 2003):158-159.
51  IAC, “Climate Change Assessments,” 1.
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it has also been the subject of great scrutiny and criticism, becoming increasingly 
visible as the concern and controversy around climate change has grown.
When the science of anthropogenic climate change moved out of the con-
fines of traditional academia and into the public domain, a highly polarized debate 
ensued.52 The atmosphere surrounding climate change became noticeably more 
political in the build up to the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, with powerful lobby 
groups53 and developing countries54 voicing the fiercest critiques. 
Criticisms of the IPCC come from across the political spectrum. Those 
who critique the IPCC include both those who flatly deny anthropogenic climate 
change (and therefore challenge the very existence of the IPCC) to those who 
question IPCC mission or methods.  In 1994, for example, Boehmer-Christiansen 
contended that the IPCC represented a “global change research agenda” propa-
gated by a “‘Northern’ science bureaucracy,”55 a critique echoed by criticisms of 
inadequate representation from developing nations.56 
Concerns with technical or scientific methods used in IPCC reports have 
also been identified. For example, the Global Commons Institute published a let-
ter protesting the 1995 Second Assessment Report Cost/Benefit Analysis (CBA), in 
which less value was given to a life lost in a developing country than in a devel-
oped one; the Global Commons Institute characterized this as an “economics of 
genocide.”57  While the Executive Summary was being finalized for WG-I in 1995, 
the Global Climate Coalition, an industry-related NGO, expressed concerns about 
the flux adjustment made to correct the divergence between model projections of 
present climate and observations, claiming that it reduced confidence in simula-
tions of future climates.58 
Procedural critiques can also receive significant attention from the wider 
public. Following the Second Assessment Report, an op-ed of the Wall Street 
Journal59 and a report issued by the Global Climate Coalition60 alleged that modi-
fications made by a lead author of WG-I after the plenary meeting and before final 
approval violated both procedural rules and ethics.61 
A prominently featured scientific result from the Third Assessment Report 
was also object of considerable controversy.  A graph of temperatures over the past 
millennium estimated from proxy records (such as tree rings) showed a sharp rise 
in temperature in the 20th century that closely matched increasing greenhouse gas 
emissions from human activity. This so-called ‘hockey stick’ graph was seen as “visu-
52  Muir Russell et al., Independent Climate Change E-mails Review, July 2010: 18, 36.
53  Agrawala, “Structural and Process History,” 625.
54  Dahan-Dalmedico, “Climate Expertise,” 73.
55  Boehmer-Christiansen, “Global Climate Protection Policy,”142-3.
56  Agrawala, “Structural and Process History,” 629-630.
57  GCI, http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Nairob3b_.pdf. 
58  Simon Shackley, et al., “Adjusting to Policy Expectations in Climate Change Modeling,” 
Climatic Change 43 (1999): 415.
59  Frederick Seitz, “A Major Deception on Global Warming,” Wall Street Journal June 12, 
1996.  http://www.sepp.org/Archive/controv/ipcccont/Item05.htm.
60  Dennis Wamsted, “Doctoring the Documents?” Energy Daily 24,98 (1996):1-2.
61  Paul Edwards and Stephen Schneider, “The 1995 IPCC Report: Broad consensus or 
‘scientific cleansing’?” Ecofable/Ecoscience 1,1 (1997): 5.
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ally arresting scientific support for the contention that fossil-fuel emissions are the 
cause of higher temperatures.”62 The graph and its primary author, Michael Mann, 
quickly became high-profile objects of criticism. In 2003, a mining engineer and 
an economist published an article arguing that Mann’s work used flawed data and 
methodology.63 The debate grew increasingly political when it was taken up by 
the U.S. House of Representatives. The affair resulted in several highly publicized 
investigations and a report by the National Academy of Science to investigate the 
validity of the underlying research. 
More recently, a series of emails was stolen in November of 2009 from 
the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia. Critics 
contend that the emails demonstrate that “data may have been manipulated or 
deleted in order to produce evidence of global warming.”64 The incident, known 
as ‘climategate,’65 energized criticism of the IPCC largely because the researchers 
involved were seen as highly influential in the IPCC process.  Shortly thereafter, in 
January 2010, several errors were found in the Fourth Assessment Report, the first 
and most widely cited of which related to the rate of glacial melt in the Himala-
yas. This incident, which was seen as exposing weaknesses in IPCC procedures, 
came to be known as ‘glaciergate.’66  From a historical viewpoint, it is clear that 
‘climategate’ and ‘glaciergate’ are only the latest incarnations of a two decade-old 
disagreement about how (or if) the governments of the world should respond to 
human-induced climate change.
In March of 2010, following the ‘climategate’ and ‘glaciergate’ scandals, 
IPCC Chairman Rajendra Pachauri and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon 
commissioned the InterAcademy Council (IAC) to review the processes and proce-
dures of the IPCC.67 The IAC is a multinational organization of science academies 
formed in 2000 to serve as an advisory body for national governments and large 
international organizations such as the UN and the World Bank.68  The IAC works 
on a project-by-project basis, and produces reports on a wide range of subjects 
related to science and technology. The IAC’s review of the IPCC was published on 
August 30, 2010 in time for the comments to be incorporated into the process for 
the Fifth Assessment Report. 
Major Categories of IPCC Critiques
Critiques of the IPCC come from diverse organizations and from across 
the political spectrum, including physical and social science researchers as well as 
62 “Hockey Stick on Ice – Politicizing the Science of Global Warming,” The Wall Street Jour-
nal February 18, 2005.
63  Stephen McIntyre and Ross McKitrick, “Corrections to the Mann et al (1998) Proxy Data 
Base and Northern Hemisphere Average Temperature Series,” Energy and Environment 14, 6 (2003): 
751-771.
64  UK Parliament, House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee, The disclosure 
of climate data from the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia, HC 387-I, March 31 
2010: 63.
65  See http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2221. 




individuals that do not self-identify as climate experts or advocates. Furthermore, 
critiques vary widely according to the subject of the critique, its general tone, and 
the extent of supporting evidence. We have identified three discrete categories 
of critiques, based upon the aspect of the IPCC being evaluated: its mission, its 
procedures, or the content of its assessment reports.
Mission critiques are aimed at the underlying purpose of the IPCC, either 
its purported goals or the philosophy of creating assessments. This includes claims 
that a single organization cannot simultaneously serve a scientific and political 
purpose without being untrue to both (e.g. “since ‘consensus’ is a political notion, 
not a scientific notion, a goal of ‘consensus’ in any forum is at its heart a political 
goal”69). Additionally, assertions that the IPCC serves to set the agenda of North-
ern countries (e.g. “the countries of Africa are resisting pressures from the former 
colonial powers in what these countries see as unwarranted interference with their 
affairs”70) form another kind of mission critique. 
Procedural critiques are those that criticize the organizational structure or 
processes of the IPCC. This includes specific problems with the review process or 
the way that authors are selected. Some procedural critiques are broader, such as 
those contending that the alternating cycle of IPCC reports and United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meetings, the primary 
forum for international climate policy negotiation, renders the reports inadequate 
to inform the negotiations.71
Content critiques are concerned with information or the underlying scien-
tific evidence for the conclusions reached in the IPCC reports. These critiques are 
aimed at how information is gathered, processed or interpreted (e.g. “[t]he critical 
value of climate sensitivity to greenhouse gas was overstated because it had not 
been properly calculated.”72) This type of critique is aimed at not at how the IPCC 
is structured or why it exists, but instead at what it says. 
While these categories are by no means mutually exclusive, using them has 
allowed us to come to a fuller understanding of the main sources of controversy 
surrounding the IPCC.
Mission Critiques
Mission critiques generally fall into one of four categories. The first, and 
perhaps most common, alleges that the IPCC has an agenda beyond its stated 
purpose. These criticisms contend that the IPCC is driven by overtly biased goals, 
such as a “state-promoted and established climate orthodoxy” which puts the 
broader climate community in danger of “Lysenkoism.”73 In these critiques, it is 
claimed that the IPCC is driven by “the environmentalists’ agenda,”74 or that data 
69  John Christy, Presentation to IAC Council in Montreal, June 15, 2010: 3.
70  William Alexander, “The IPCC: Structure, Processes and Politics Climate Change—the 
Failure of Science,” Energy and Environment 18, 7 (2007): 1075.
71  Haas, “When Does Power Listen to Truth?” 583.
72  Christy, Presentation, 3.
73  UK Parliament, The Disclosure of Climate Data, 88.
74  Richard Tol, “Biased Policy Advice from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change,” Energy and Environment, 18, 7 (2007): 929.
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is “relentlessly [mis]used to promote the IPCC’s alarmist conclusions.”75 
A second type of mission critique holds that the tensions between science 
and policy are such that the IPCC, which aims to serve both, cannot be an effec-
tive organization. For example, Holland finds that any organization comprised of 
its own “member governments…can hardly be policy neutral.”76 Others find the 
entire idea of environmental policy to be dictated by value judgments and merely 
cloaked in science: according to one author from South Africa, “environmental 
concerns are a luxury enjoyed by affluent societies.”77 Others take issue with the 
organization’s implicit conflation of normative meaning and scientific projections: 
Charlesworth and Okereke contend that by assuming that risk management is the 
appropriate response to the uncertainty surrounding future climate change, the 
IPCC is making “normative assumptions with which a large section of the global 
population might not necessarily agree.”78 These types of mission critiques il-
lustrate the difficulty of completely separating ‘objective’ scientific facts from value 
judgments, because even “scientific information is frequently presented with an 
accompanying meaning, such as ‘safe’ degree of warming.”79 
A third type of mission critique relates to climate science itself. Christy, 
for example, feels that “a fundamental problem…is that climate science is not a 
classic, experimental science. As an emerging science of a complex, chaotic climate 
system, it is plagued by uncertainty and ambiguity.” Such a science, he argues, 
“easily becomes hostage to opinion, groupthink, arguments-from-authority, [and] 
overstatement of confidence” which he says characterize the IPCC.80 Similarly, 
Alexander identifies that “the essence of the [IPCC’s] difficulty is the impossibil-
ity of applying process theory to a problem that can only be solved by applying 
observation theory.”81
Finally, a fourth type of mission critique relates to the IPCC’s goal of creat-
ing consensus and acting as the singular authority on climate change. Tol finds 
that this position of singularity is itself the source of the IPCC’s problem—oper-
ating without enough checks and balances—“monopolies are easily seduced into 
abusing their power.”82 Haas contends that while a consensus view is appropriate 
and necessary for cognitive authority, the IPCC is unable to do this effectively be-
cause it was “designed to keep science on a tight leash by controlling the selection 
and autonomy of individual scientists engaged in the assessment process.” 83 
This perception about IPCC comes from reports that creating the intergov-
ernmental panel represented “a means to ‘buy time’ before engaging in serious 
75  Holland, “Bias and Concealment,” 957.
76  Holland, “Bias and Concealment,” 952.
77  Alexander, “The IPCC,” 1074.
78  Mark Charlesworth and Chukwumerije Okereke, “Policy Responses to Rapid Climate 
Change: An Epistemological Critique of Dominant Approaches,” Global Environmental Change 20 
(2010): 123.
79  Brian Wynne, “Strange Weather, Again: Climate Science as Political Art,” Theory, Culture 
& Society 27, 2–3 (2010): 300.
80  Christy, Presentation, 1.
81  Alexander, “The IPCC,” 1073.
82  Tol, “Biased Policy Advice,” 933.
83  Haas, “When Does Power Listen to Truth?,” 583.
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policy decisions” in the context of the disagreement between the US Environmen-
tal Protection Agency and Department of State (who wanted action) and the De-
partment of Energy (who did not). 84 However, Siebenhüner’s research challenges 
this perception by concluding that, despite involvement of government representa-
tives, the growing internationalization associated with “the evolution of the IPCC 
has led to a decreasing influence of national governments.”85  
Grundmann argues that certainty and consensus are not necessary for 
progress to be made on policy. As he points out, in the case of ozone protection, 
political agreements were reached amidst greater uncertainty than in the climate 
situation because key researchers coupled their scientific findings with policy rec-
ommendations.86  He claims that the epistemic community created by the IPCC 
has resulted in stalling policy action on climate change, since the “least common 
denominator” consensus view cannot overcome the considerable resistance in the 
US.87 
Procedural Critiques
Procedural critiques focus on the many different processes involved in the 
IPCC structure and production of reports, especially the selection of authors, the 
review process, and the report structure. The IAC review was tasked specifically to 
address procedural concerns. 
The process of selecting authors and review editors is the object of consid-
erable criticism. Haas asserts that the way in which the scientific community is 
recruited and organized in the IPCC “assures governments that they will be able 
to exercise maximum control over individual scientists, as well as remaining able 
to shape the political agenda for climate change negotiations.”88 He finds that this 
design explains why “negotiated treaties within the climate change regime have 
not reflected a strong degree of scientific basis, despite the ongoing IPCC efforts.”89 
Christy contends that the “political process” by which governments nominate au-
thors and editors results not in those best suited for the job, but in those on whom 
“they can generally count…to be consistent with national policy.”90 Tol points out 
that the same people who developed the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
were charged with evaluating those very same scenarios; “unsurprisingly, they 
conclude that they had done a rather splendid job.”91 
Part of the IAC’s review of the IPCC involved a questionnaire which was 
sent to individuals involved in the assessment process, government representatives, 
84  Hecht, A. D. & Tirpak, D. 1995 Framework agreement on climate change: a scientific 
and policy history. Climate Change 29, 371–402, p. 381.
85  Siebenhüner, B. The changing role of nation states in international environmental assess-
ments—the case of the IPCC. 2003. Global Environmental Change 13 (2003) 113–123, p. 121.
86  Reiner Grundmann, “Ozone and Climate: Scientific Consensus and Leadership,” Science, 
Technology, & Human Values, 31 (2006): 89.
87  Grundmann, “Ozone and Climate,” 90.
88  Haas 2004, ibid, p. 584.
89  Haas 2004, ibid, p. 583.
90  Christy, Presentation, 6. This critique seems to ignore the fact that the United States, very 
prevalent in the IPCC authorship, has no national policy with regards to climate change.
91  Tol, “Biased Policy Advice,” 929.
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and outspoken critics of the IPCC. While the IAC review noted that most respon-
dents to their questionnaire were supportive of past author teams, the criteria for 
selecting authors were characterized as arbitrary:92 
[S]ome scientists expressed frustration that they have not been nominated, 
despite their clear scientific qualifications and demonstrated willingness 
to participate. Frustration was particularly strong among developing-
country scientists, who felt that some of their Government Focal Points 
do not always nominate the best scientists from among those who 
volunteer, either because they do not know who these scientists are or 
because political considerations are given more weight than scientific 
qualifications.93
The selection of which studies to include in the reports is similarly contro-
versial. The use of non-peer reviewed literature has been a particularly common 
source of criticism—Tol, for example, claims that too many unpublished confer-
ence papers are used to support statements,94 while Holland contends that the 
IPCC’s reliance on peer-review for quality control is flawed: “There is no com-
mon standard for this and the IPCC…undergoes no ‘due diligence’ checks in the 
validity of the science it summarizes.”95 The IAC found the existing procedures 
regarding unpublished or non-peer-reviewed sources adequate, but observed that 
they “have not always been followed.”96
Finally, many criticize the overarching structure and timing of the IPCC 
assessment reports. Christy points out that because of their sheer size, the reports 
take an excessively long time to be compiled, and reviewed, rendering them “out-
of-date” as they are printed.97 He holds furthermore that the word count limit 
imposed on the authors “encourages short and overconfident statements.”98
Content Critiques
Content critiques, relating to the scientific study of how our climate is 
changing and why, are perhaps the broadest of the three categories. Alexander, 
an example of those who dismiss outright the concept of anthropogenic climate 
change, finds that the causal link between rising greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change is “unsupportable… The obvious alternative causal mechanism [is] 
natural variation in solar activity.”99
Other content critiques do not challenge whether humans are changing 
the climate, but are concerned with more technical aspects of the reports. The 
most common objects of criticism are the use and interpretation of proxy data to 
92  IAC, “Climate Change Assessments,” 18.
93  Ibid, 18.
94  Tol, “Biased Policy Advice,” 931.
95  Holland, “Bias and Concealment,” p. 954.
96  IAC, “Climate Change Assessments,” 19.
97  Christy, Presentation, 5.
98  Christy, Presentation, 4.
99  Alexander, “The IPCC,” 1076.
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characterize the past temperature record; the legitimacy of the historic temperature 
record; and the use and interpretation of climate models. Critics of the proxy tem-
perature records discuss the challenge of interpreting measurements of proxies that 
are not uniquely determined by temperature,100 the inclusion or exclusion of some 
data records over others,101 and the choice of appropriate measures of statistical 
skill.102 Those who object to the historic record of measurements of land tempera-
ture frequently discuss the magnitude of the urban heat island, by which warm-
ing trends occur due to the proximity of weather stations to cities with growing 
populations.103 Others contend that stations have been removed or manipulated to 
provide the appearance of a warming trend.104
Critiques of the climate models used in IPCC assessments include those 
who question the use of models themselves: “IPCC models are just hypotheses, 
not established scientific fact.  In fact, with respect to climate predictions decades 
into the future, they cannot even be tested in order to quantify their skill.”105 In 
other criticisms, the difficulties in parameterizations of clouds, water vapor, and 
aerosols,106 as well as models’ limited ability to project regional variability107 have 
all been used to question IPCC conclusions. 
While the most common claim is that overconfidence in flawed models 
diminishes uncertainty with the aim of exaggerating danger,108 Wynne argues that 
climate models actually underestimate the likelihood of abrupt changes because of 
their structure. He concludes that actual future climates may be worse than what 
the IPCC has projected.109 Oppenheimer et al. suggest further that models may 
be incapable of projecting some outcomes because of completely absent or poorly 
characterized processes. For example, the models used in the Fourth Assessment 
Report did not include polar ice sheet melt when estimating projected sea level 
rise, thus resulting in an “unrealistic decrease in the range and lowering of the 
100  Holland, “Bias and Concealment,” 956.
101  Stephen McIntyre and Ross McKitrick, “Hockey Sticks, Principal Components, and 
Spurious Significance,” Geophysical Research Letters, 32, L03710 (2005): 3.
102  McIntyre and McKitrick, “Hockey Sticks,” 4.
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maximum value of projected sea level rise.”110 
Overlapping Categories
A critique may fall into more than one category, either because multiple 
critiques are presented together, or because one category logically implies the other. 
For example, Holland asserts that the science behind the IPCC is “biased, sloppy, 
and protected from exposure by concealment of the underlying data and method-
ology, and by a well organized ‘spin’ process.”111 This critique falls into the content 
category (the science is “sloppy), the procedural category (there is a structural fail-
ure of transparency which allows methodologies to be concealed), and the mission 
category (the IPCC uses a “spin” process to abet its “bias”). 
Similarly, Corfee-Merlot notes that the dearth of social science literature 
in IPCC reports “demonstrates the dominance of techno-rational or predictive 
analytical traditions in the field of environmental policymaking.”112 Such a critique 
touches both on the IPCC’s procedures (it does not have the necessary framework 
to adequately incorporate the social sciences) as well as its mission and overarch-
ing philosophy (as an organization, it is biased towards to technical and predictive 
fields). Critiques like these demonstrate the difficulty of extracting the essence of a 
single critique-- there may be multiple aspects of the IPCC with which the author 
takes issue, but they are often expressed as a single criticism.
In other cases, a criticism in one category may be based on an implicit cri-
tique from another. Alexander asserts that the principle of anthropogenic climate 
change is based on faulty science (which would purportedly be a content critique). 
If this were true, the IPCC must be advising action to counter climate change 
because of a hidden political agenda. This sort of content critique (‘the science is 
faulty’) is based on a mission critique (these organizations use faulty science be-
cause they are biased towards “alarmist predictions,” and they suppress dissenting 
opinions in order to protect those predictions113).
In discussing procedural controversies that arose during the Second Assess-
ment Report, Edwards and Schneider note the vagueness of many IPCC rules is 
due to its primary design as a scientific body. 114 While defending this informal-
ity as inherently linked to a scientific culture of ongoing revision, they agree that 
“openness and inclusivity” are crucial in the sociopolitical realm, and that more 
procedures might be needed to balance scientific and political legitimacy.115 The 
IAC review seems to agree, with multiple recommendations for greater oversight 
and more explicit attention to conflicts of interest. These findings, which explicitly 
address IPCC procedures, are in fact very closely related to mission: to what degree 
should the IPCC reflect the iterative processes common to the scientific process? 
To what degree must it display the openness required by political institutions? 
110  Michael Oppenheimer, Brian O’Neill, and Mort Webster, “Negative learning,” Climatic 
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What is the proper balance between policy relevance and policy neutrality?
Finally, the estimation and expression of uncertainty provides an excellent 
illustration of the interactions between problems of procedure and content. In the 
Third and Fourth Assessment Reports, the IPCC provided guidelines to authors 
on how to express uncertainty, thus becoming a question of procedure. How-
ever, the IAC noted that the different Working Groups in the Fourth Assessment 
Report had characterized uncertainty differently:116 WG-I and II used quantitative 
scales to express likelihood of an event occurring or probability of confidence in a 
statement, whereas WG-III used a two-pronged qualitative scale, which expressed 
the amount of evidence and the degree of agreement among experts. Although the 
IPCC procedures allowed use of the likelihood or confidence scale only for asser-
tions for which there was much evidence and high agreement, confidence state-
ments were made in WG-II that did not meet this criterion.117
Uncertainty and its accurate expression are integral to scientific assertions, 
and thus intimately tied to the content of IPCC reports. Uncertainty has been 
a key focus of critiques of the IPCC, with most critics asserting that it has been 
underestimated.118 The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, for ex-
ample, noted that WG-II co-chairs took a risk-oriented approach and emphasized 
negative impacts because those findings would be most relevant to policy mak-
ers; consequently the “upper ends of uncertainty ranges (the worst outcomes that 
are projected) were highlighted.”119 Malnes asserted that the “IPCC is guilty of 
duplicitous communication. The scientists who sign the conclusions of the panel’s 
research voice more confidence in the greenhouse theory than evidence permits.”120 
Other critiques argue that uncertainties are underestimated due to the desire for 
consensus in areas for which there is not sufficient knowledge. 121 
IV. Recommendations for IPCC Reform
Many recommendations have been put forward for IPCC reform. While 
some suggestions require a general overhaul of the international climate assessment 
process, others are relatively minor. Tol has suggested that oversight of the IPCC 
be moved from the UNEP to the International Council for Science.122 Christy rec-
ommends removing word limits to allow the report’s authors more space to fully 
express uncertainty.123 
Although several recommendations revolve around better enforcement of 
current procedures,124 others call for the dissolution of the IPCC. Zorita suggests 
116  IAC, “Climate Change Assessments,” 28.
117  IAC, “Climate Change Assessments,” 34.
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the establishment of an International Climate Agency, comprised of a full time 
staff of scientists instead of volunteers, with the mandate of issuing biennial “state-
of-the-climate reports.”125 Christy proposes a “living, carefully-managed, wiki-
pedia-style process,” which would result in constantly updated assessments as an 
alternative to the current static reports. 126  Others agree that more frequent reports 
would be better than the current time-consuming exhaustive assessment process.127
The recommendations for reform from the IAC highlight their procedural 
focus: “The IPCC should establish an Executive Committee.”128 “The IPCC should 
elect an Executive Director to lead the Secretariat.”129 “The IPCC should adopt 
a more targeted and effective process for responding to reviewer comments.”130  
However, the IAC review also made recommendations regarding the expression of 
uncertainty. They noted that phrases such as `very unlikely’ are interpreted differ-
ently from how they are defined and proposed that the numerical definition should 
always accompany qualitative scales.131 The IAC further recommended that all 
three Working Groups adopt the qualitative ‘level-of-understanding’ scale, to be 
accompanied by a numerical likelihood or confidence scale when there was much 
evidence and high agreement.132
VI. Discussion
Scientific denialism
Many critiques point out real problems with IPCC structure, its mission, 
and the accuracy of its reports. However, on occasion, criticisms move away from 
reasoned argumentation to take on the characteristics of scientific denialism, a 
phenomenon in which a few vocal opponents challenge the consensus view of a 
majority.  
Diethelm and McKee define denialism as the “employment of rhetorical 
arguments to give appearance of legitimate debate where there is none.”133 They 
identify several characteristics of scientific denialism, including the use of con-
spiracy theories. In these theories, an ulterior motive is usually attributed to ‘the 
establishment’ and those involved in the conspiracy are assumed to somehow profit 
from the hoax’s continued existence, either financially or through consolidation of 
power. An example in the scientific community is the claim that the peer-review 
process is in fact a way of suppressing dissenting opinions. In this logical trap, 
pointing out that the majority of experts concur with a generally accepted finding 
in Mike Hulme, et al., “IPCC: Cherish it, Tweak it or Scrap it?” Nature 463, 7282 (2010): 731.
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serves as evidence that there is, in fact, a conspiracy. Some critiques of the IPCC 
have overtones of conspiracy theories—such as claims that “the controllers of the 
climate agenda” have let “ideology…govern their interpretation of reality” and 
that there is an “industry of folks on the make from ‘climatechangeism’, swapping 
jobs…and hats.”134
Another characteristic of denialism is the marginalization of experts by 
discrediting them or attacking their personal characteristics. Agrawala attributes 
this tactic to the US fossil-fuel lobby, alleging they have employed the strategy of 
“if you don’t like the message, discredit the messenger.”135 The controversy fol-
lowing the hacked emails from University of East Anglia displayed this quality, 
in the sense that the scientists were accused of “unethical and potentially illegal 
behavior.”136 The investigation conducted by Sir Muir Russell also reflects this 
emphasis on the messenger instead of the message: the report clearly aimed to 
examine the “honesty, rigour and openness” of the CRU researchers and was not 
concerned with “the validity of their scientific work.”137
Logical fallacies such as the excluded middle are common to denialism and 
characterize certain critiques of the IPCC. The excluded middle is invoked when 
a certain phenomenon is seen as resulting in either many consequences or none 
at all. In this context, if any fact relating to climate change is disproved, then the 
entire premise of anthropogenic climate change can be rejected. This fallacy was 
widely exhibited in the ‘glaciergate’ scandal, where errors found in WG-II of the 
Fourth Assessment Report were taken as sufficient grounds to reject the entire 
report and anything that was based on it. For example in the words of Sen. In-
hofe’s Minority Report of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee: 
“Because the EPA’s endangerment finding for greenhouse gases rests in large part 
on the IPCC’s science, the endangerment finding should be thrown out.”138
A final tactic of denialists is the creation of impossible expectations. Ostensi-
bly, the goal of those critics who call for more research is to increase knowledge for 
better informed decisions; an alternative interpretation is that they are stalling to 
avoid action to which they are opposed. Republican pollster Frank Luntz explicitly 
recommended requiring greater certainty regarding climate change science in a 
2003 memo to the Bush administration (emphasis in original): 
Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are settled, 
their views about global warming will change accordingly. Therefore, you 
need to continue to make the lack of scientific certainty a primary issue in the 
debate. […] Emphasize the importance of ‘acting only with all the facts in 
134  Agrawala, “Structural and Process History,” 5.
135  US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works,‘Consensus’ Exposed: The CRU 
Controversy, 2010: 1.
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hand ’ and ‘making the right decision, not the quick decision.’139 
If taking action against climate change is conditional upon complete certainty, 
no action will ever be taken, since uncertainty can never be dispelled. Those who 
aim to exploit this uncertainty can even actively ‘manufacture’ doubt: as a tobacco 
executive in 1969 so succinctly expressed, “Doubt is our product since it is the best 
means of competing with the ‘body of fact.’”140
Contrasting views of the science-society interface
The most basic critiques of the IPCC’s mission provide insight into the 
broader interactions between science and society. Two clear schools of thought 
exist in the debate over the relationship between normative beliefs and scientific 
statements in the science-for-policy relationship. While one school contends that 
science should remain pure and distinct from political considerations, the second 
acknowledges that even apparently objective estimates often involve normative 
assumptions or are communicated with a normative framing (such as references 
to concepts of ‘danger’ or ‘safety’). The former school endorses a strict separation 
of science and policy in which scientific-technical advice is provided by an elite mi-
nority, while the second argues for greater transparency and an open discussion of 
assumptions, which is only possible through broader representation of stakeholders 
and greater democratization. 
The first school of thought is clearly expressed in criticisms from a number 
of elite scientists and some of the organizations with which they are associated 
(such as the Science and Environmental Policy Project or the George Marshall 
Institute, which aim to assess the scientific and technical information used for 
policy decisions141). These scientists tend to favor basic and experimental sciences 
over applied sciences like climate science.142 They are skeptical of imperfect climate 
models, which are seen as inferior to elegant reasoning based on first principles.143 
Such critiques are consistent with the ‘sound science’ narrative, which requires 
high levels of evidence for the existence of environmental threats.144 This school of 
thought is related to sociopolitical values, where the considerable “trust in sci-
ence and technology as providers of solutions to problems”145 is closely aligned 
with regulation-averse perspectives. In this positivist and linear-model conception 
of science-for-society, in which a technocratic elite counsels the government of 
unambiguous facts, there is no place or need for consensus. This perspective would 
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abolish the IPCC or aim to separate more strictly the different areas of climate sci-
ence, impacts, and response.
The success of the consensus voice of the IPCC in climate policy is still de-
bated and debatable: the lack of an international agreement in the 15th Conference 
of Parties would seem to suggest failure, as does the inability for even countries 
with strong political will (such as Denmark) to meet their Kyoto pledges.146 This 
seems to suggest that democracy cannot solve global environmental problems and 
that “experts, not citizens and their elected representatives, should be the creators 
of climate change policy.” 147 But who are the experts? How do we define expertise, 
and what gives them their authority? How can one be sure that the normative as-
sumptions necessary to policy are equitable and appropriate? 
This is where the constructivist school of thought provides some insight: 
if normative beliefs are inevitable in the intersection of science and society, the 
assumptions must be explicit, transparent, and debated. While it is true that 
scientific facts are not resolved through either negotiation or voting, the work of 
the IPCC or other boundary organizations transcends purely scientific objectives. 
The resistance to predictions of the future can be addressed by “democratising 
policy rather than leaving it principally to economists and other experts who 
might not share the same normative position as large groups or even the majority 
of citizens.”148 As proposed by Lidskog and Elander, “participation, representation 
and deliberation are crucial for a reasoned and consultative debate. Consensus 
may not be reached, but yes, perhaps a reasoned compromise.”149  For some, the 
creation of the IPCC reflects the evolution of larger social processes, namely the 
worldwide spread of democracy, as defined by a system where “decisions are made 
by a negotiated consensus in a spirit of equality, mutual accommodation, and 
commitment to the community process;” Weart notes that through international 
organizations such as the IPCC, “panels of scientists were becoming a new voice in 
world affairs.” 150  
According to the constructivist school of thought, the primary value of 
international environmental assessments lies not in the written reports themselves, 
but in the social process by which expert knowledge is organized, evaluated, and 
presented.151 It is not just substantive (content) knowledge which is of value, but 
also procedural or process knowledge. Process knowledge becomes even more 
important when it can learn and evolve: Biermann notes that the IPCC enjoys 
relatively greater legitimacy in India compared to other environmental assessments 
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because it is “designed as an iterative process instead of a single event.”152 
The Future of the IPCC
Although the IAC review did not purport to evaluate the mission of the 
IPCC, one of its recommendations would significantly expand the organization’s 
current role. Consistent with previous characterizations as a boundary organiza-
tion, the IAC describes the IPCC as “sitting at the interface between science and 
politics,” contributing to “a working dialogue between the world’s governments 
and scientists.”153 The IAC goes on to highlight the increasing need to “speak to 
audiences beyond scientists and governments.”154 In the wake of ‘climategate’ and 
‘glaciergate,’ criticisms from all sectors of society “underscore the need for a media-
relations capacity to enable the IPCC to respond rapidly and with an appropriate 
tone.”155 In other words, the IAC has recognized that while the IPCC may have 
been established initially with the relatively narrow goal of informing official 
government climate policy, it now has a broader role as a general climate science 
communicator.
The IPCC should not see this expanded role as a superficial media or public 
relations one. Instead, it should recognize that it now plays a defining role in the 
global conversation on climate change, such as the one indicated by Nisbet et al., 
“including partnerships among individuals, academia, the media, science orga-
nizations, faith-based groups, businesses, and a diversity of stakeholders across 
local communities – so that communication efforts about climate change be-
come more diverse, more personal, more interactive, more compelling, and more 
participatory.”156
We conclude that if the IPCC continues to expand toward greater transpar-
ency, opening a global debate in which assumptions are examined by scientists, 
politicians, and societal stakeholders, there will be greater opportunities for new 
solutions and for their implementation. This may appear naïve in the face of un-
equal power, fundamental disagreements over the science-society interface, and the 
complexity of the necessary information. However, if we acknowledge that ten-
sions will always exist, increased information and debate should be welcomed, not 
avoided. Of the many institutions operating in the international climate change 
forum, none is better equipped than the IPCC to lead this conversation.
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